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The true measure of the success of a program of international and technical collaboration is not
in its accomplishments during the period it is in force but rather in what happens after foreign aid
has been withdrawn.
– George Harrar, 1967
I.     INTRODUCTION
I feel doubly privileged to be invited to this Mombasa Retreat because it is well-
known that ASARECA (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and
Central Africa) is the shining star in the galaxy of seven regional research organizations (SROs).
ASARECA is a dynamic organization that is being taken seriously by members of the donor
community.
But I must confess straightaway that I have participated in more failures than successes in
institution-building projects in Africa over the past forty years. My first experience dates back to
the early  l960s when I spent three exciting  years helping to construct a Land Grant- type of
university at the University of Nigeria.  But the Land Grant model never took root in an
environment where  both research and extension were entrenched in the Ministry of Agriculture
(Johnson and Okigbo, l989).  In Senegal , I helped design the socio-economic component of a
$106 million multi-donor, six-year project to strengthen ISRA, the NARS (National Agricultural
Research System) of Senegal (Eicher, 1982).  But the ISRA project turned out to be much too
large, complex and financially unsustainable (Eicher, 1985).  Despite these failures in Nigeria,
Senegal and a number of other countries, I take refuge in the idea that institution-building should
be viewed as a learning process – learning by doing and learning from others.   What I have
gained in maturity has more than offset what has been lost in excitement.
Professor Mrema directed me to prepare a ‘frank’ paper that “looks into the future with
an eye on the past.” Therefore, I shall leapfrog over a discussion of the strategic role of
agriculture in development and the performance of African agriculture and move directly to an4
analysis  of Africa’s unfinished business:  building a sustainable agricultural research foundation
(Lynam and Blackie, 1994).
Professor Thomas Odhiambo was ahead of his time with his article, “East Africa: Science
for Development” (Odhiambo, 1967).  He called for the coordination of national and regional
science policies in East Africa and urged African governments to dramatically increase their
investment in science education, starting in primary schools.  Much has happened in Africa in
the intervening three decades. The number of universities has grown at a rapid pace and the
percentage of African scientists in NARS  increased from 10 percent in the sixties to around 90
percent in the early nineties  (Pardey et al. 1997).  But during this same period, the number of
scientists and administrative costs of the NARS increased at a faster pace than the growth of
funds to support them.  As a result, spending per scientist declined by 34 percent  from 1961 to
1991  (Pardey et al. 1999).  One example of high administrative overhead is an African NARS
that currently has nineteen Assistant Directors in its headquarters.
The 1980s can be described as a golden decade for agricultural research in Africa.  The
World Bank made its first loan for agricultural research in Africa (Sudan) in 1979.  ISNAR was
set up in 1980 followed by SPAAR in 1985, and the donor community invested US$ 4 billion in
agricultural research in Africa from 1980 to 2000 (McCalla, 2000).  However, by the mid-
nineties, there was a slowdown in donor funding for agricultural research and questions were
raised about the poor performance of NARS.   The slowdown is troublesome because many
NARS in Africa are heavily dependent on foreign aid (an average of 40 percent) for their budgets
and because the NARS of Africa are considered to be the weak link in the global agricultural
research system  (Pardey et al. 1997).  Faced with a slowdown in foreign aid, managers of NARS
in Africa are in a quandary over how to downsize their organizations while seeking to maintain
quality, retain gifted researchers and pursue new sources of financing.
This paper addresses four questions:
•   What lessons can be drawn from the “rise and decline” of NARS in Africa?
•   What can African research managers learn from some of the successful reforms of
NARS in Asia and Latin America over the past 10 to 15 years?
•   What are the major challenges facing the NARS in the ASARECA region in the
coming 10-20 years?
•   What are the critical reforms and the incentives needed to develop pluralistic,
accountable, productive and financially self-sustaining NARS in AFRICA?5
II. THE AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE TRIANGLE
A number of specialists in institutions have recommended using a systems approach to
coordinating and sequencing inter-linked investments in agricultural research, extension and
education.  This approach has been called an agricultural knowledge system (Roling, 1986),
agricultural knowledge information system (AKIS), (World Bank, 2001) and what I call the
agricultural knowledge triangle (Eicher, 1999).  Three key pillars -- research, extension and
agricultural higher education---make up the agricultural knowledge triangle (system).  The
development and diffusion of new technology is critically dependent upon the joint performance
of these three pillars.  Since the pillars are complementary investments, they should be planned
and sequenced as a system rather than as separate entities.  Also, since these pillars are risky and
have long- term payoffs, the government, rather than  individuals or private firms, is usually the
main investor at early stages of economic development.  As a result, government investments  in
research produce public goods such as new technology that spills over and benefits more than
one socio-economic group and future generations (Kaul et al. 1999; Dalrymple, 2001; Alston et
al. 2001; Anderson, 2000).
The economic case for coordinating and sequencing investments in research, extension
and education is straight-forward.   The returns to investment in agricultural research will be low
if extension agents and seed and fertilizer companies are not available to diffuse new technology
and turn it into commercial success.  Likewise, the returns to investment in extension will be low
if extension agents are not continuously recharged with new technology from public and private
research organizations.  Finally, since the quality of scientific human capital is the main
determinant of research productivity, the returns to investment in national research services will
be low if the research agency is not reinvigorated with a continuous flow of well-trained
university graduates.  These examples point up the need to craft agricultural research triangles
that promote interaction and cooperation between research, extension and universities.
However, instead of investing in all three pillars of the triangle, most donors have
pursued a pillar by pillar approach to helping African nations strengthen agricultural institutions.6
Why?  Even when comprehensive donor projects have embraced research, extension and higher
education, these projects have proven to be difficult to coordinate and implement in Africa. Also,
the bureaucracy of donor and international organizations makes it difficult to prepare and
implement projects covering the three institutions represented in the knowledge triangle.  A
former extension specialist in the World Bank describes the bureaucratic difficulties in preparing
and implementing joint research, extension and agricultural higher education projects:
“The Bank’s involvement with the development of higher agricultural education
at the university level in Africa has been minimal…within the Bank, the
Agricultural Divisions have no responsibility for universities, which are the responsibility
of the Education Divisions…It is not therefore surprising that the Bank projects in
extension and research do not provide support to higher agricultural education”
(Venkatesan, 1991).
What has been the record of donor investments in separate extension, research and higher
education institutions across the African landscape?  The pillar by pillar approach to institution
building has created poorly sequenced, dysfunctional, and generally oversized and unsustainable
agricultural institutions in Africa.  Has there been an under-investment in one of the three pillars?
The World Bank reviewed its global expenditures on agricultural research, extension and higher
agricultural education and found that, over the 1987-97 period, agricultural higher education
received about 2 percent while agricultural research and extension together received 98 percent
of the Bank’s $4.8 billion of global investments in agricultural education, research and training
(Table 1).  How did African higher education fare in this $4.8 billion package?  During the 1987-
97 period, the Bank made six agricultural higher education loans totaling $108 million, including
three for Africa: Ghana, Uganda and Ethiopia (Willett, 1998).
To summarize, many donor specialists and academics have encouraged African nations to
build national agricultural knowledge triangles (systems).  But in practice, this has proven to be
difficult because most donor agencies are unwilling to finance agricultural education projects.
Also, it has proven difficult to implement comprehensive projects embracing all three pillars
when the directors of research and extension departments and Vice Chancellors and Rectors
report to different ministries.7
III.  THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NARS IN AFRICA:  1960-2000
                   FALSE STARTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Before we examine the rise and decline of NARS in Africa, it is important to
acknowledge three strongly held beliefs about development in the early sixties and how these
beliefs continue to reinforce large inward looking NARS today.  At independence, most African
leaders believed that the state---not the private sector---should be the central planner, financier,
entrepreneur, and risk-taker in generating jobs and “bringing development to the people.”  This
belief in a large and powerful state was consistent with the bureaucratic norms of the agricultural
service programs that were planned at the center.  The highly centralized T &V extension model
that was introduced in Africa in the late seventies was compatible with the prevailing view of the
role of the state in top down development planning.
The second belief concerns the time and ability of donors to speed up the development
process through large infusions of foreign aid.  Back in the sixties, most African leaders
articulated a vision of becoming modern industrial nations in one generation.  Many western
development economists believed that foreign aid could close the gap between rich and poor
nations in one generation, i.e., around year 2000.  But institution building is an accretionary
process that unfolds over a period of many decades.  For example, it took 70 years (1855 to
1925) for Michigan State University to produce its first Ph.D. graduate.  EMBRAPA, the NARS
of Brazil, is now being lionized for its sterling research system, but it should be kept in mind that
Brazil has been independent for 179 years!  How long will it take African nations to develop its
human capital capacity in biotechnology?  Can it be done in 5 to 10 years?  I cannot think of a
single African  agricultural economist who is currently specializing in the economics of
biotechnology.
The third false belief that accompanied independence was a conviction that one model  of
extension,  food production or university could be introduced, scaled-up and sustained in an
African nation.  Various models have been introduced, including T & V extension, Land Grant
Universities and the SG 2000 Food Production model.   The Land Grand model was discontinued
in the 1980s and the T &V model was quietly abandoned in the late 1990s after the Bank had
aggressively promoted it in some 30 countries in Africa.  These false beliefs in a large state
sector, an unrealistic time frame and “the single model fits Africa”, help explain why it has been
so difficult to craft country-specific, sustainable institutions in Africa since independence.8
How do we reconcile the decline of NARS and reduction in donor support for research in
Africa in the 1990s with the numerous studies showing high rates of return to agricultural
research in Africa (Oehmke and Crawford, 1996)?  This is an important issue because many
donor projects to strengthen NARS in Africa typically Justify the investment by pointing out that
the annual rate of return on agricultural research projects in Asia is 20 to 30 percent, well above
the World Bank’s decision rule of requiring a minimum projected return of 10 percent on new
projects.
I discovered the potential value and the shortcomings of rate of return studies a decade
ago when Daniel Karanja (1990) tallied up the cost and returns of investments in hybrid maize
research in Kenya from 1953 to 1988.  He found that the annual rate of return on the investment
in hybrid maize research in Kenya was 68 percent over the 35 years period.  However, when
Karanja completed his study in 1990, Kenya’s maize research program had lost its momentum in
terms of the release of new hybrids, and I concluded that while Kenya’s maize research program
was an economic success, it was an institutional failure.  I also concluded that I had erred in not
helping Mr. Karanja figure out  the kinds of data that he should have collected to unravel the
institutional puzzles surrounding the slowdown in the release of new varieties:
The collapse of maize research in Kenya in the 1980s and early nineties , despite
the high average annual rate of return to investment in hybrid maize research (68 percent)
from 1953-1988, illustrates why rate of return calculations must be supplemented with a
rigorous analysis of the institutional factors that influence the scientific discovery process
and the ultimate productivity and financial sustainability of the research program
(Eicher, 1991).
REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘DECLINE OF NARS’
The history of agricultural research in Africa represents the unfolding of a learning
process and the search for a new paradigm for the development of national agricultural research
systems (Byerlee, 1998).  Since the strengths and weaknesses of the colonial research strategies
have been documented (Eicher, 1989), my focus is on the rise and decline of NARS from 1960
to the year 2000.  Four factors have contributed to the rise and decline of NARS in Africa since
independence.  The first is an array of factors  – historical, political, macro economic, and
ideological – that have undervalued the role of a strong science base in development and the
need to develop a  strong national capacity to borrow and or develop new technology, and turn it
into commercial success.  The lack of African political support for research is a chronic problem
which has been partially offset by  increased donor support for research to a point where foreign9
aid is now paying for an average of 40 percent of the budget of African NARS.  This high degree
of donor dependency has enabled African research managers and scientists to postpone building
partnership with farmer groups and the private sector.  The generous level of foreign aid to
agricultural research  has also postponed the mobilization of domestic financial resources to
finance the core budgets of NARS in Africa.
 The second major factor contributing to the poor performance and the decline of many
NARS is attributed to an array of project design problems such as preparing projects that are too
large, too complex, and for too short a time span.  In addition, many donor-financed projects are
bereft of ideas on how to assist in building human capital chains, human capital ladders, local
financial mobilization, and the development of  peer-reviewed research programs.  These design
problems have plagued donor-supported projects over the past two decades (Eicher, 1982, 1985,
1989, 1999).
Inflated size is a serious problem in donor-assisted projects for NARS in Africa.  But
large projects are partially a function of  donor guidelines and incentives to prepare and manage
large projects.  In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, African governments were encouraged to
spend one to two percent of their agricultural GDP on agricultural research – the same level as
most industrial countries.  Fortunately, this simple guideline is no longer used in donor circles
because of the realization that money is not a substitute for time in building scientific capacity.
Another indirect contributor to the preparation of large projects is the uncritical use of high rate
of return estimates from research projects in industrial and Asian countries.  But ex post rate of
return studies are a backward looking assessment and they provide no guidance on the future
financial and scientific sustainability of a NARS.  To summarize, both the average percentage of
agricultural GDP that is spent on research and the uncritical use of rate of return studies have
contributed to inflated and financially unsustainable donor projects intended to strengthen
NARS.
The third factor contributing to the decline of  NARS is the institutional coordination
problem, i.e. the coordination and sequencing of investments in research, extension and higher
education.  The experience in Uganda and Burkina Faso illustrates the difficulty in coordinating
concurrent investments in the three pillars. In 1993, the World Bank agreed to finance the
Uganda Agricultural Research and Training Project which included research, extension and
agricultural education.  However, the original idea of financing a single agricultural services
project, was dropped at an early stage of project preparation because “the readiness for10
implementation of each component was different.”  In Burkina Faso, analysts had difficulty in
preparing a Research and Agricultural Services Project because donors quarreled over three
competing extension models. Finally, donors have little interest in investing in agricultural
higher education in Africa.
To summarize, it has proven difficult for African governments and donors to design,
prepare and implement umbrella projects incorporating research, extension, and agricultural
education because of bureaucratic problems between agriculturalists and educators in donor
headquarters, and competition among universities and research and extension departments in
Africa.  Sadly, donors, as much as national governments, actively oppose real coordination.  As a
result, a comprehensive approach to building agricultural knowledge systems will not be
forthcoming until African scientists, educators and extension specialists stand up and say
“enough”  (Blackie, 2001).  The way forward is for African agriculturalists to seize the initiative
and provide leadership in crafting country-specific agricultural knowledge systems.
The fourth factor contributing to the poor design of many projects to assist NARS is the
financial sustainability problem and the tendency for donors to contribute to the expansion of a
NARS beyond its capacity to be financed after donor aid is phased out.  When I was on
sabbatical leave at ISNAR in the Hague in 1988, Emil Javier, ISNAR Senior Research Officer
and now Chairman of TAC, noted that many donor experts were looking through the wrong end
of the scientific telescope by asking how to finance an expanded NARS instead of figuring out
what size NARS can ultimately be financed from national sources and how to curb NARS
expansion.   Javier urged me to study the connection between the size of a NARS (number of
scientists, number of research stations and number of commodity research programs) and the
financial sustainability of a NARS.  As a result of Javier’s prodding, I prepared an  ISNAR
report,  Sustainable Institutions for African Agricultural Development and I defined a sustainable
NARS as one that has “the ability to mobilize domestic political support to pay the salaries and
required operating costs of the core scientific staff from national sources”  (Eicher, 1989, p.25).
When I prepared my study in 1989, I examined the donor projections of support for agricultural
research in Africa and concluded that there was a high probability that transferring an average of
$300 million a year into the NARS (of Africa) over the next five years will overload the NARS
with buildings, equipment and increased recurrent costs.  I concluded that this rapid build up of
foreign aid may “postpone the day of reckoning”—i.e., the need to develop African political
support to finance the core costs of NARS from domestic sources  (Eicher, 1989, p.25).11
AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE
Looking ahead, it is important to discuss the role of African universities in building
scientific capacity in food and agriculture because they are being asked to increase the output of
post-graduate students and make a bigger contribution to agricultural research. But post-graduate
training in agriculture is in its infancy.  Most of the faculties of agriculture in African universities
are only 30 to 40 years old.  African universities performed brilliantly in increasing the output of
undergraduates from 1960 to 1980 (Ajayi et al. 1996).  In 1996, there were around 160
universities in Africa, with roughly half in three countries: Nigeria, 37; South Africa, 21; and
Sudan, 21 (Beintema et al. 1998).  But the decline of the undergraduate educational experience is
encouraging students of affluent African families to go overseas for their studies.  Part of the
quality problems is attributed to financial pressures and part is attributed to the time that it takes
to build quality post graduate degree programs and sustain these programs decade after decade.
Three strategies have been used to introduce and strengthen agricultural education in
Africa.  The first was the introduction of the U.S. Land Grant University model in the 1960s and
1970s with its triple mission of research, extension and teaching.  U.S. universities, with USAID
support, helped set up a number of new universities in Africa that embodied some of the Land
Grant ideas.  Also, a number of two year agricultural colleges were upgraded into four year
universities.  But the research and outreach missions of the Land Grant model were in conflict
with entrenched research and extension departments in Ministries of Agriculture.  The Land
Grant model collapsed in practice and many of these new universities were converted into all-
purpose universities with primary attention given to undergraduate teaching.  Because of the
failure of Land Grant model in Africa in the sixties and seventies, delegations from Nigeria and
Tanzania visited India and studied the State Agricultural model.  Subsequently, three universities
of agriculture based on the Indian model were set up in Nigeria but they all are experiencing
difficulties (Idachaba, 1999).  After a Tanzanian delegation visited India, the Sokoine University
of Agriculture in Tanzania was established by upgrading the Faculty of Agriculture at Morogoro
into a University with emphasis on agriculture, forestry and veterinary medicine.  Both the U.S.
Land Grant and the Indian State Agricultural University models have foundered in Africa, once
again proving that imported institutional models have a high failure rate.
The second big university experiment was the 20 year global University Development
Program financed by the Rockefeller Foundation from 1963 until 1983.  Three African12
universities (Nairobi, Ibadan and Kinshasa) participated in this 12 country global experiment
under the theme of “universities for development.” The Foundation terminated the program after
20 years because of mixed results and unexpected political difficulties in a number of countries
such as the Congo and Nigeria.  This experience points out the amount of time that it takes to
develop strong postgraduate programs, adequate infrastructure, a motivated and well-paid
academic staff, and adequate indigenous financial support to ensure sustainability (Coleman and
Court, 1993).
The third institutional innovation in agricultural higher education was an attempt to
mobilize African academic staff with advanced degrees to carry out agricultural research of
mutual interest to NARS and Ministries of  Agriculture.  Mrema reports that:
            Many universities in Africa have a large stock of agricultural scientists with M.Sc.  and
Ph.D. degrees.  For example, in 1995, there were 547 African scientists with a Ph.D. in
agriculture employed by universities and 357 in the NARS (National Agricultural
Research Systems) in Eastern and Southern Africa (Mrema, 1997).
The World Bank has incorporated funding mechanisms (Agricultural Research Funds and
Competitive Grant Schemes) into NARS projects in order to tap into this pool of university talent
for research (Oniang’o and Eicher, 1998).  Competitive Grant Schemes are now in operation in
World Bank-financed projects in Malawi, Kenya, Ghana and a number of other countries.
Although these funding mechanisms have been conceptualized as a method of “integrating
universities into the NARS” (Byerlee and Alex, 1998), there have been many problems in “the
NARS/university relationship” (Castillo, 1997).  Conflict and misunderstanding are common in
relationships between the strong (NARS) and the weak (faculties of agriculture (Castillo, 1997)..
A professor at an African university recently summed up the university/NARS relationship as
follows: “At  present, academics and NARS staff view each other as competitors.”
Today, there is agreement that African agricultural universities and faculties of
agriculture have the primary responsibility to train and mentor the next generation of extension
leaders, researchers and teachers.  But one cannot avoid coming to grips with three harsh
realities. First, there has been a sharp drop in the quality of the educational experience in many
universities in Africa.  Second, HIV/AIDS is wiping out many of the younger agricultural
scientists and teachers even before they have  completed their post graduate studies.  Finally,
African universities are ill-equipped to train the next generation of scientists to compete with
scientists in other continents in a world of rapid scientific progress. Yet despite these difficulties,
some universities in Africa have mounted aggressive reforms, including raising student fees,13
privatizing catering services, setting up university consulting services, expanding distance
education programs, and adding new courses in horticulture, agribusiness and marketing.  These
universities include the following:   Makerere University (World Bank, 1999), University of Dar
es Salaam, the University of Pretoria and the University of Lagos.  African governments should
study the pay off to long-term (40 to 60 year) capacity-building projects in Latin America.  In
Brazil, for example, three fourths of EMPRAPA’s scientists are pursuing M.Sc. degrees and
more than half of those pursuing Ph.D. degrees are now enrolled in local universities (Beintema
et al. 2000a).
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE
The role of agricultural extension  is vital to the diffusion of new technology yet
extension is currently moribund in many African nations.  This dilemma can be best understood
in historical perspective.
Three models of agricultural extension have dominated Africa’s extension programs
since independence.  The first is the quantitative model.  In the sixties, Western experts assumed
that technology from temperate climates could be transferred to Africa provided that the number
of extension agents was dramatically increased.  Many governments adopted this model and
African governments collectively added 36,000 new extension agents (from 21,000 to 57,000)
over the 1959 to 1980 period (Judd et al. 1986).  The quantitative model collapsed because of
poor management, a lack of new technology to extend and problems of financing the expanded
system.
The second model of extension---the T&V model---was a highly centralized model that
attempted to improve the management of national extension systems.  The model was propagated
by Daniel Benor, a former Director of Extension in Israel, who helped the World Bank introduce
the T&V model in Turkey in the late 1960s, and later in India.  The World Bank introduced the T
& V model in Africa in the 1980s and Benor served as a Special Advisor to the President and
later, Special Advisor to the Vice President for Africa in the Bank.   During the eighties, the
Bank proudly announced that T&V extension programs were in operation in some 30 African
nations.
Kenya has been the testing ground for claims and counterclaims about the performance of
the T&V model.  The T&V system of agricultural extension management was introduced by the14
World Bank in Kenya in  1982.  Two Bank projects supported the program until 1998.  A recent
study by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the Bank concluded that “The
performance of the T&V system as applied in Kenya has been disappointing.  The system as
implemented has been ineffective, inefficient and unsustainable”  (Gautam, 1999).  The rise and
fall of T&V extension in Africa offers a sobering example of the failure of a model that was
aggressively promoted in Africa without pilot projects, independent Africa-wide evaluations and
without careful attention to its fiscal sustainability. Today, African agriculturalists are more
seasoned and less gullible in accepting the proposition that one extension model can serve the
diverse needs of 48 countries in Africa.
A third extension model is now emerging in Africa:  the private/contract extension
(Nielson and Bazeley, 2000; World Bank, 2001; Gemo and Rivera, 2001).  The private extension
model is now under discussion in Mozambique and in the early stage of implementation in
Uganda (NAADS, 2001).  Five reasons are driving this intense interest in the privatization
model.  First, many of the national extension programs are starved for operating funds because of
reduced government budgets for the Ministry of Agriculture.  Second, after 10 to 20 years of
experience with the T & V model, many governments realize that the donor-financed T & V
schemes were too large in terms of the number of staff, number of vehicles, etc. to be financed
by African governments after foreign aid is phased out.  Third, private extension has been
effective for export crops where farmers are taxed to finance both research and extension.
Fourth, private extension is emerging in rich countries such as the Netherlands, New Zealand and
the United States.  Fifth, village and church groups have been set up to deliver extension advice
in the vacuum created by the collapse of national extension systems.  For example, in the Embu
district of Kenya, the collapse of the government’s artificial insemination program in 1999 and
2000 has been filled by two rival church societies which are offering artificial insemination
services to smallholders at substantially higher prices (400 to 1050 KSH)  than the nominal sum
(40 KSH) previously charged by the government’s veterinary extension program.
Nevertheless, there are some tough questions to be addressed in the current debate on the
privatization of extension in rural areas where the average per capita GDP is one or two dollars a
day and farmers are asked to contribute to the “care and feeding” of a private extension agent?
Do we have any examples where the poor have bought their way out of poverty?  If not, should
donors step in and offer loans to African governments who in turn will make funds available to
farmer groups/villages who will sign contracts with private firms to provide extension advice?15
After three years of debate and review of alternative extension models, Uganda’s Parliament
approved a NAADS Act on May 2, 2001 which establishes the institutional framework for the
creation of a private extension model -- the National Agricultural Advisory Services Project
(NAADS).  This model will use pooled funding from donors which will flow to the Treasury to
Districts, and Sub-Counties.  The Sub-Counties will turn funds over to farmers’ organizations
which will use the funds to set up contracts with extension agents or NGOs to provide extension
services to local farmers.  This new model of private extension will be closely observed because
it represents a major departure from the traditional government extension model (NAADS 2000).
To summarize, we are witnessing a profound shift away from the centralized T & V
model to more pluralistic, open and flexible models of extension. The World Bank has quietly
withdrawn its dogmatic support for the T & V (Training and Visit) model of extension amid a
cry for more decentralized pluralistic and participatory extension systems.  Daniel Benor has left
his World Bank post and the Bank is financing a new private extension model in Uganda.16
IV.  REFORMING NARS IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA
Although our government (the U.S.) has been actively engaged in technical assistance in
agriculture throughout Latin America for two decades, the sad truth is that not a single
first-class agricultural research center has been developed as a consequence of these
activities.                      -  Nobel Laureate, T.W. Schultz, 1964
INTRODUCTION
The historical experience of building and reforming NARS in Asia and Latin America in
the fifties and sixties is brilliantly captured in Albert Moseman’s Building Agricultural Research
Systems in the Developing Nations (1970).   Although this classic about viewing institution
building as an ongoing learning process has been out of print for many years, it is timely and
relevant in Africa today.  Five country studies in Asia and Latin America illustrate some of
lessons to be drawn from building, reforming and re-reforming NARS.  The Latin American
studies shows that rapid progress has been achieved in building agricultural research capacity in
the region since Schultz’s gloomy assessment of 1964.
Japan
The critical role of smallholder agriculture in Japanese economic history is often
overlooked by contemporary development specialists and donor agencies because Japan is
known today as a nation with a highly subsidized agriculture.  But 100 years ago, Japan was a
pioneer in developing institutions to support small family farms and it did not subsidize its
farmers.  Japan’s experience is relevant to Africa today because it was a pioneer in Asia in
showing how a nation with tiny farms pragmatically pieced together an agricultural knowledge
system to undergird a smallholder-led agricultural revolution from 1868 to 1914.
Japan’s phenomenal economic transformation from a feudal to an industrial power in one
generation (1868-1912) was based on a development strategy that fostered the concurrent growth
of agriculture and industry, a smallholder farm production model and a reliance on its own
resources--not foreign aid  (Hayami, 1988). The results were impressive.  Japan’s smallholder
agricultural strategy generated the same long-term annual agricultural growth rate (1.6%) as the
U.S. farmers using horses, and later tractors, over the 100 year period, 1880 to 1980  (Hayami
and Ruttan, 1985).17
Soon after Emperor Meiji assumed the reigns of power in 1868, he established a new
government called the Meiji Restoration, which committed Japan to rapid modernization based
on compulsory universal primary education (1872) and imported agricultural and industrial
technology from the US and Western Europe.  To achieve rapid modernization through
technology borrowing, Emperor Meiji dispatched a high-level mission headed by Vice President
Iwakura to tour the United States and Europe for 22 months (not 22 days) from 1871-1873.
Members of the mission filled hundreds of notebooks with information on every facet of industry
and farming in the U.S., including a meticulous analysis of large-scale mechanized farms,
equipped with horses and reapers.  The Mission then visited eight European nations, including
Germany, where they were fascinated with the embryonic research on chemical fertilizer and
science-based agriculture.
Japan then hired teachers from the United States and England to teach in its newly-
established agricultural colleges.  Nevertheless, in the early 1880s after less than a decade of
experimenting with imported technology in industry and agriculture, the Meiji government came
to the conclusion that foreign technology was a stunning success in industry, but a failure in
agriculture. The economic failure of the American model of large-scale farming in Japan
prompted the Meiji government to set up a Ministry of Agriculture in 1881 mandated to develop
a new agricultural strategy to increase yields on small farms through the application of chemical
fertilizer and improved seeds.
Japan pragmatically started an extension service by hiring veteran farmers and charging
them with spreading improved farm practices throughout the country and mobilizing farmers as a
political force.  In 189l, the veteran farmers met in Tokyo and established a new organization,
the Agricultural Society of Japan, to extend technical information to farmers modeled after the
Royal Agricultural Society of England.  Three years later, the National Agricultural Association
was established to exercise political influence on behalf of farmers.  All farmers in Japan were
required by law to join the Association and pay membership fees.  Thus, the seeds of agrarian
power in Japan were grounded in compulsory farm membership and group action to acquire
political power for farm people.  Africa has much to learn about this experience.
To summarize, Japan pragmatically pieced together the three AKIS pillars through a trial
and error process over a period of four-to-five decades.  But unlike many African countries over
the past forty years, Japan enjoyed political stability and it relied on its own creativity and18
resources to experiment, restructure and develop its country-specific agricultural knowledge
system, rather than one based on foreign models and the whims of foreign aid.
Malaysia
Malaysia’s development experience is a “rags to riches” story that is underreported in the
development literature, partially because it eschewed foreign aid, foreign experts and foreign
models.  At independence in 1957, Malaysia’s per capita GDP was $350, the same as Ghana’s.
Rubber claimed the lion’s share of the agricultural research budget from 1925 until the
Malaysian Agricultural Research Institute (MARDI) was established in 1971 (Ruttan, 1982).
Malaysia increased its agriculture research staff from 100 officers at independence in 1957 to
1,000 in the 1980s.  In the late 1960s, Malaysia embarked on a massive agricultural
diversification program away from rubber and Malaysian scientists skillfully borrowed hybrid oil
palm seedlings from the Congo and used them to developed hybrids suitable for Malaysian agro-
ecologies.  At independence in 1960,Nigeria was the world’s leading oil palm exporter, but
Malaysia’s dynamic R & D program enabled it to expand oil palm production and replace
Nigeria as the world’s leading oil palm exporter (Eicher, 1989).
 In the early 1980s, long before donors urged African nations to liberalize markets and
increase exports of non-traditional crops, Malaysia had embarked on a global search for new
domestic and international markets for its farm products.  When I visited Malaysia in 1988, I met
with Dr. Hashim Noor, one of my former students, who was director of MARDI’s Socio-
Economic Department that employed 57 of the 1000 scientists in MARDI.  I was impressed with
MARDI’s socio-economic research on value-added crops, including a study of taxicabs burning
palm oil diesel fuel, research on rubber carpets for airport runways and for ferreting out new
global markets for oil palm by commissioning studies of consumer tastes in Germany for various
cooking oils.  The Socio-Economic unit also commissioned Japanese consulting firms to
interview Japanese consumers about their papaya preferences.  After the preference studies were
completed, MARDI breeders spent the next 12 years perfecting a sweet (hand-sized) papaya
geared to Japanese and Hawaiian palates.
Today, Malaysia’s per capita GNP is US$3670 compared with $390 in Ghana.19
India
India’s buildup of its agricultural research system since independence is one of the best-
documented stories in the scientific world.  This buildup was aided by the threat of famine,
dedicated Indian leadership, the serendipitous availability of high-yielding wheat varieties from
Mexico in the mid sixties, and the long-term assistance from USAID and the Rockefeller and
Ford Foundations to strengthen India’s agricultural knowledge system.
In 1956, the threat of famine prompted the Government of India to invite a team of
Rockefeller Foundation scientists to figure out how to strengthen its wheat research program.  In
the early sixties, India agreed to import  high yielding wheat varieties from Mexico, followed by
high yielding rice varieties from IRRI in the Philippines.  The rest is history.  India became self-
sufficient in food in 1981.
Without question, agricultural scientists enjoyed unusual access to political leaders in
Asia in the 1960s because of the threat of famine in the region.  F.F. Hill, an agricultural
economist and Vice President of the Ford Foundation, and Norman Borlaug, a wheat breeder
from the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, made numerous joint visits to Asia and aggressively
made the case for a science-based agriculture in the political arenas in India and Pakistan. Hill
and Borlaug made a practice of meeting with the Head of State after the completion of their fact-
finding missions to India and Pakistan.  On  October 16th 1968, Hill and Borlaug discussed the
findings of their field visits with the President of Pakistan.  Two days later, they prepared a
memorandum for President Khan and stressed the need to build strong national agricultural
institutions:
Pakistan cannot rely solely on innovations from the International Center for
Maize and Wheat Improvement  (Mexico) and the International Rice Research Institute
(Philippines) and other outside sources.  It must continually test and adapt what it can get
from abroad, but it must innovate as well.  The nature of agricultural production and the
underlying biological sciences dictate the need for a strong agricultural science base
within Pakistan.  This means that Pakistan must produce increasing numbers of well-
trained young scientists in her universities.  It must develop and support agricultural
research organizations that will provide young scientists opportunities and
encouragement to make the maximum contributions of which they are capable (Hill and
Borlaug, 1968).
India is a textbook example of how a poor country can eschew the pillar by pillar
approach to institution-building and concurrently build an interactive agricultural knowledge
system.  During the sixties and seventies, the Ford Foundation financed a large scale extension20
buildup, the Rockefeller Foundation helped strengthen agricultural research and USAID helped
conceptualize and finance a new institutional innovation – State Agricultural Universities.  Since
the World Bank, Japan, the EU and other major donors were not on the scene in India in the
early sixties, donor coordination was relatively easy to achieve among the USAID and the two
American Foundations (Lele and Goldsmith, 89).
Today, India has a large, self-confident, inward-looking NARS with 18 percent of its
agricultural research being done by the private sector.  However, the inward looking posture of
India’s NARS stands in sharp contrast with EMBRAPA in Brazil.
Brazil
Brazil initiated a public research program for farmers about 150 years ago (Ruttan, 1982).
In 1972, Brazil set up EMBRAPA (Brazilian National Agricultural Research Corporation)  to
coordinate its national research program (Yeganiantz, 1984).  Today, Brazil has 18 percent of its
labor force in agriculture, and 5000 full-time equivalent (FTE) agricultural researchers, roughly
half of whom are in EMBRAPA  (Beintema et al. 2000a).  The other half are in state research
organizations and the private sector.  Today, one half of Brazil’s researchers have a Ph.D., one
third have a M.Sc. and the balance have B.Sc. degrees.  Brazil’s agricultural research budget was
US$ 325 million in year 2000 (Portugal, 2000).  Agriculture R&D expenditures per scientist
increased at an average annual rate of l.3 percent from $143,000 in the late seventies to $202,000
in 1996 (in 1993 dollars) (Beintema et al. 2000a).
Since EMBRAPA’s inception some 30 years ago, Brazil’s economy grew rapidly in the
seventies followed by economic crises in the eighties (the currency was devalued four times in
the 1986-1994 period).  But EMPRAPA’s management team skillfully managed its core research
programs despite these wide swings in government expenditures on research.
EMBRAPA’s human capital improvement program is one of the most impressive in the
developing world.  In 1963, USAID financed collaborative agreements between four Brazilian
and four U.S. counterpart universities to strengthen agricultural higher education in Brazil
(Sanders et al. 1989). After a decade of strengthening undergraduate education, the four
university contracts were extended another four years to strengthen post graduate education.
When EMBRAPA was formed in 1972, it launched a massive human capital improvement
program and spent about 20 percent of its total budget from 1974-82 on various training21
programs in Brazil and abroad.  EMBRAPA had an average of more than 300 researchers
enrolled each year in post-graduate training programs in the late 1970s and through the 1980s.
Today, EMBRAPA is an outward-looking organization with 1562 alliances with local,
regional and international organizations  (Portugal, 2000). EMBRAPA and the state universities
and private sector are deeply involved in developing  new technology to support the expansion of
agricultural exports (mainly coffee, soybeans and sugar) and value-added activities such as
gourmet coffee for overseas consumers.
Many NARS in Africa have been urged to increase their research on traditional and non-
traditional export commodities.  The contrasting experience of Brazil and Malawi illustrates how
aggressively Brazilian scientists have moved to compete in global gourmet coffee markets.
Brazil has long been known as a producer of cheap Robusta coffee that is used in the
manufacture of instant coffee.  However, because of the rapid increase of Robusta exports from
Vietnam and other countries,   Brazilian coffee growers and the Brazilian Specialty Coffee
Association recently teamed up with several international coffee buyers (Illycaffe SpA of Italy
and Starbucks Corp. of Seattle) and formed a Coffee Alliance to improve the quality of Brazilian
coffee for overseas specialty markets.  Brazil has introduced new Arabica varieties along with
new methods of drying and processing coffee.  In late 2000, the Coffee Alliance developed a
gourmet coffee Internet auction, and foreign buyers paid Brazil US$1.38 a pound at a time when
the world coffee price was at a seven year low of 65 cents a pound (Wall Street Journal, 2001).
Turning to Malawi, coffee has been the principal cash crop for smallholders in northern
Malawi since the 1950s.   In 1971, the Government of Malawi set up a Smallholder Coffee
Authority (monopoly) and gave it exclusive control over buying coffee from small holders and
processing and marketing it.  The Coffee Authority quickly abolished village cooperatives, and
took over their coffee processing activities and then “taxed” smallholders by paying them a small
fraction of the world price of coffee.  Malawian smallholders responded to this draconian “coffee
tax” by discontinuing the maintenance of their coffee trees and made weekly treks to the
lowlands to grow tobacco (Buccola and McCandlish, 1999).
In the early nineties, the Malawian government announced a liberalization plan to phase
out the Coffee Authority and allow private firms to buy coffee from farmers and cooperatives.
In 1994, the principal secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture assured an American investor (a
former Peace Corps volunteer in Malawi) that the Smallholder Coffee Authority would soon be
disbanded and he warmly endorsed the plan of the potential American investor to set up the22
African Gourmet Coffee Company and purchase coffee from smallholders in Malawi for
gourmet markets in the United States.  In 1995, the African Gourmet Company offered
Malawian farmers US$1.88 per kg. of green coffee (about a 400 percent increase over what the
Coffee Authority had paid farmers in 1994).   The Coffee Authority responded by raising its
farm price from US$.043 to US$1.10 per kg.  Although the Coffee Authority offered farmers a
lower price than the African Gourmet Coffee Company, the Authority still was able to purchase
90 percent of the 1995 crop because it controlled the village level processing plants to which
farmers brought their coffee. In 1996, the Coffee Authority had a staff of 657 employees, rows of
houses for its extension staff and a fleet of four-wheel drive vehicles).  Although, the Coffee
Authority  continued to lose money, it resisted being dismantled.  After two years of operation,
the fledgling African Gourmet Coffee Company experienced cash flow problems and closed its
operations in Malawi.  This case study illustrates the large gap between the theory and practice
of liberalization programs and how far Malawi is behind Brazil and Viet Nam in helping small-
holders compete in global markets.
Today, Brazil is a powerhouse in the global agricultural research arena.  Brazil’s
agricultural research budget was $325 million in year 2000, slightly less than the $340 million
for the entire CGIAR research system (Portugal, 2000).  More importantly, foreign aid
contributed only 1.6% of Brazil’s agricultural research budget in 1999 (Beitema, 2000a).
Although T.S. Schultz lamented the weak NARS in Latin America in the 1960s, today he would
undoubtedly point with pride to the strong NARS in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay.
Uruguay
Since the early 1980s, most of the NARS in Latin America have been pressured by their
governments to restructure their agricultural research agencies and find alternative sources of
funding. Uruguay is a small country of three million people and it has much in common with
many countries in Africa.  In 1989, the government established the National Agricultural
Research Institute (INIA) as the country’s principal agricultural R&D agency, but it has allowed
INIA to remain an autonomous institution (Echeverria, 2000).  Today, there are six agricultural
R&D agencies in Uruguay and INIA employs about 40 percent of the total scientists in the
country.  INIA has 328 full time scientists and its annual agricultural R&D expenditure per
scientist is US $117,000, half of that of Brazil (Beintema et al. 2000).23
INIA is noted for being a disciplined and well-managed NARS.  It has been innovative in
generating about 30 percent of its annual budget from a 0.4 percent tax on the value of
agricultural products with matching funds provided by the government. INIA has also been
innovative in setting up two competitive funding mechanisms, one of which was established with
the creation of INIA in the late 1980s.  The average funding per approved research proposal was
US $34,000 over the 1991-1998 period.
LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA
What can Africa learn from the experience of Latin America and Asia? Latin America’s
experience reinforces the point that developing scientific capacity is an accretionary process that
unfolds over many decades.  During the early stages of agricultural growth, NARS have been
restructured frequently to achieve the desired coverage in terms of agro-ecological areas and an
optimal degree of centralization and decentralization of research stations.  Also, the decision of
Latin American governments to reduce funding to NARS, starting in the early 1980s, turned out
to be a blessing in disguise because it forced the managers of NARS to develop new sources of
revenue, and to increase their partnerships with universities, NGOs and the private sector.
Today, a new paradigm of agricultural research is emerging in Latin America.   Figure 1
represents a stylized sketch of a pluralistic NARS in Latin America and it depicts three levels of
interaction.  The first level is composed of regional and national commissions charged with
laying out the agricultural research policy framework and identifying national research priorities.
The second level is financed from a variety of sources, including production taxes on farm
products, joint ventures with private firms, competitive grants, etc.  The third level is execution.
The NARS is still the main actor in implementing national agricultural research programs, but in
many cases universities and private firms have increased their importance in the execution of
research.  This global overview reveals that the NARS  of Asia and Latin America have
introduced an array of institutional innovations that have made them more pluralistic,
accountable and financially sustainable.
This comparative institutional assessment has shown that many Asian and Latin
American countries have pragmatically pieced together agricultural knowledge systems over
time.  Japan and Malaysia had the advantage of building their own systems without the
“intrusion” of foreign aid.  India received major support from only three major donors in the24
1960s and 1970s.  This stands in sharp contrast to Zambia’s 180 agricultural projects funded by a
dozen donors in 1996 (Eicher 1999).  Brazil made a decision in the sixties to build the
institutional foundation for a modern agriculture and obtained financial support from USAID to
finance teaching and research assistance from four American universities.  Finally,  the  financial
crises of the 1980s have induced NARS to mobilize new sources of revenue and search for a new
paradigm for NARS which has increased the participation of universities and the private sector in
research.
Two sobering insights emerge for Africa from this comparative assessment.  First, the
agricultural science base was  much deeper in Asia and Latin America in the sixties.  Scientists
such as Norman Borlaug and F.F. Hill urged Asian nations to strengthen the agricultural science
base in Asia because they argued that it takes the same level of scientific training to develop new
technology as it does to become “intelligent borrowers” of new technology from the global
system.
The second insight that emerges from this comparative institutional analysis is that it is
difficult, but not impossible, for African research managers and scientists to develop effective
agricultural knowledge triangles in Africa.  If Asia and Latin American can achieve this goal, it
can be done in Africa.   But the task is more difficult in Africa because of the weak agricultural
science base and because foreign aid, as Mellor points out, is being held captive by a myriad of
special interests which are promising short run results.
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW NARS PARADIGM
IN AN ERA OF DECLINING DONOR SUPPORT
African research managers are well aware that they will have to restructure, and probably
downsize their NARS in order to make them more productive, accountable and fiscally
sustainable.  Africans will have to take the lead in this effort because of the poor performance of
many donor-financed agricultural projects in Africa, and the trend of special interest groups to
take over the foreign aid agenda and marginalize agriculture.  John Mellor sums up the current
aid scene and what it means for agriculture:
Foreign aid is now captive to a myriad of special groups.  Today they include child
survival, vitamin A, microcredit, poverty, microenterprise (excluding agriculture)
empowerment of women, environment, wildlife preservation, and on and on. . . Priorities and25
strategy cannot coexist with such a panoply of special interests, each with its own objectives
(Mellor, 1998).
In the mid 1990s, after 10 to 15 years of structural adjustment programs and a rapid
buildup of donor support for NARS in Africa, donors started to reduce their global support for
agriculture and increase their lending for micro-finance, democratization, privatization, rural
livelihoods, and poverty alleviation.  What explains this shift in donor priorities  away from the
pursuit of “old fashioned” agricultural growth?  Part of the answer is based on the perception that
the world food problem has been solved.  Part is due to donor ignorance about the strategic role
of agriculture at an early stage of development. And part is based on the fact that many donor-
supported agricultural projects are not performing well and are unsustainable.  For example,  the
sustainability of the World Bank’s agricultural projects was 33 percent in 1999, among the
lowest of any sector in the Bank’s portfolio.
Another reason for a reduction of donor funding for traditional agricultural projects is the
broadening of the scope of what is meant by “rural” to include rural livelihoods, rural health,
education and farmer empowerment.  However, the adoption of a bottom up participatory and
rural livelihood approach to development is dangerously close to the failed community
development projects of the 1950s (Holdcroft, 1998) and the IRD (Integrated Rural
Development) projects in the 1970s (Binswanger, 1998).
The slowdown in donor lending for NARS is supported by the following data:
•   Total overseas development aid to Africa fell from US$ 32  per person in 1990  to
$19  in 1998.
•   The World Bank lending for agriculture fell to below 10 percent in FY 2000, an all-
time low.   Bilateral aid (except Japan and Denmark) has declined for agriculture. EU
aid to agriculture and rural development averaged 5.9 percent for the 1986-98 period
with a sharp shift in 1995 to humanitarian aid and general budget support (Cox and
Chapman, 1999).
•   The total budget for the CGIAR has been flat at US$ 340 million for the past four
years.
•   World Bank global expenditure on agricultural research in millions of U.S. dollars
has declined:  $381, 1997; $559, 1998; $402, 1999; $39, 2000.  
•   The UNDP is closing its global program for food security and agriculture in order to
narrow its focus to areas where it has a comparative advantage.26
•   World Bank lending for the rural sector in Africa continued its long slide through the
1990s.  In FY 1990, commitments totaled about U.S.$ 1 billion (23 new projects), but
in FY 2000, they totaled U.S.$ 224 million (8 new projects) (World Bank, 2001a).
Foreign assistance can be viewed in positive and negative terms.  In positive terms,
foreign aid has trained thousands of agricultural scientists who, in turn, have helped increase the
number of universities in Africa and raised the percentage of African scientists in NARS from
around 10 percent in 1960 to around 90 percent in 1990.  But Africa’s heavy and erratic flow of
aid to NARS has created dependency and held back the kinds of institutional innovations that
have blossomed in Latin America in response to the cutback in government support for
agricultural research.
What is urgently needed is a radical rethinking of how can Africa best organize itself to
take advantage of the world’s rapid scientific progress?  Clearly, Africa’s scientific community
cannot flourish if it continues the present situation where it is heavily dependent on erratic
foreign aid for 40 to 60 percent of the budget of its national agricultural research systems.  Since
the amount of aid for agricultural projects in Africa may continue to decline in the coming
decade, the NARS managers and scientists/entrepreneurs will be forced to develop retrenchment
programs (in cooperation with ministries of finance and donors), spin off some commodity
research programs to producer groups, generate additional revenue through producer levies,
pursue contract research and alliances with the private sector and foundations, and generate
revenue from the commercialization of NARS products and services.27
V.    STRENGTHENING NARS:  ISSUES FOR DEBATE
The present ad hoc methods of building agricultural research capacity are painfully
inadequate, especially in heavily aid-dependent NARS in Africa.  Eight issues are ripe for debate
among policymakers,  research managers and donors in Africa:
1.  The Need for Aggressive Decompression
Many NARS in Africa are suspended in a bubble of foreign aid. One NARS
currently has 19 Assistant Directors in its headquarters and 35 field research
stations.  Many NARS are suffering from the sudden withdrawal of aid and the
aftershocks of their rapid expansion.  For example, the NARS of the Sudan, The
Agricultural Research Council, is reeling from the withdrawal of foreign
assistance and the collapse of the Western Sudan agricultural research project.
Many faculties of agriculture should be downsized and or consolidated.  The
Sudan currently has 20 Faculties of Agriculture (Salih, 2001).
More short term aid projects are not the answer!  A recent book, Aid and
Reform in Africa (Devarajan et al. 2001), points out that Kenya has received more
than $15 billion of foreign assistance from 1970 to 1996.  The book further points
out that aid financing in the 1980s actually “led to worse economic policies” in
Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria (2001,
p.27).
There is a need for a fundamental rethinking of the role of African
governments, private firms, NG0s and donors in the organization and provision of
agricultural research, extension and higher education.  There is a need for
aggressive decompression and opening up of NARS in Africa.  But donors have
an important obligation to assist in this process by  providing bridging funds
because excessive and erratic donor aid has been a major contributor to the
current crises in many NARS in Africa. The decompression process is now
underway in KARI in Kenya, with the assistance of the EU and World Bank in
agreement with Kenya’s Ministry of Finance, for KARI to retain the salaries of
retrenched workers.  But at the end of the day, downsizing should be viewed as
part of a process of searching for a new NARS paradigm which is built on
partnerships with NGOs, universities and the private sector.  The goal of28
decompression process is to develop an efficient NARS that can be primarily
financed from national sources.  The need for the decompression of NARS was
highlighted in my ISNAR monograph “Sustainable Institutions for African
Agricultural Development (1989).
2. The CGIAR and NARS Relationships
The CGIAR has been active in Africa for three decades and it is currently
spending about 45 percent of its budget on Africa.  Without question, the CGIAR
has made important contributions to African agricultural development.  Examples
include new maize varieties (Byerlee and Eicher, 1997), TMS cassava varieties
(Nweke, forthcoming), WARDA’s “new rice” (WARDA, 2001) and ILRI’s socio-
economic research on the livestock revolution (Ehui et al. 2000).
Despite these achievements, the CGIAR/NARS relationships have been
festering for some time in Africa.  A decade ago, I prepared a critique of the
CGIAR system and contended that the CG had taken the wrong turn in the road in
the early nineties when it increased the number of CG Centers from 13 to 18
without assurances of increased donor support (Eicher, 1992, 1994).  Later, I
raised questions about the banal recommendations of the Strong Report of 1998
(Eicher, 1999).  Recently, a Change Design and Management Team (CDMT)
studied how to strengthen the CG system and prepared a report for the CG’s Mid
Term Meeting in Durban in May 2001.  The report makes seven
recommendations, including one to enhance NARS as follows:   “the Global
Challenge Programs should generally be designed and implemented in such a way
that the capabilities of the NARS are fully mobilized” (CDMT 2001).
Unfortunately, the CDMT report does not discuss how to strengthen NARS in
Africa and enhance the voice of African scientists in figuring out how to develop
improved working relationships between the strong (the CG centers) and the weak
(the NARS).
It appears that the CDMT panel did not have the time to dig deeply into
the special problems of strengthening NARS in Africa.  After the Durban 2001
meeting, Africa will remain the Achilles’ heel of the CGIAR System.
But amid the tension in African research circles, African scholars and
research managers have prepared a list of ten recommendations on how to29
improve the CGIAR/NARS relationship in Africa (FARA, 2000).  The FARA
report is a landmark study that displays the maturation of Africa’s scientific
community and its political acumen in mobilizing Africans to take charge of the
research agenda in Africa, and ultimately, the financing of their own research
priorities (CGIAR 2001a).
3. Building Agricultural Knowledge Triangles
There is a big gap between the theory and practice of building agricultural
knowledge triangles.  We have stressed the need to coordinate and carefully
sequence investments in the three pillars of the agricultural knowledge triangle.
But in practice, donors have been reluctant to allocate funds to strengthen the
agricultural education pillar.  Also, because of different “levels of readiness” in
African governments for preparing and implementing comprehensive projects to
strengthen all three pillars, most donors end up financing research or extension
projects.  Nevertheless, many Asian and Latin American countries have
pragmatically pieced together interactive agricultural knowledge systems and
there is no reason why African countries cannot build efficient agricultural
knowledge systems.  Uganda is currently taking the lead in Africa by
restructuring its core agricultural institutions:  research, extension and agricultural
higher education.  Both African governments and donors should pay careful
attention to the reforms underway in Asia, Latin America and Uganda.
African research managers should study Brazil’s experience over the past
forty years in financing and extracting the synergies of a coordinated agricultural
knowledge triangle.  For example, EMBRAPA, the NARS of Brazil has an annual
budget of US $ 325 million, of which only 1.6 percent is derived from foreign aid.
Brazil has paid particular attention to human capital improvement.  In the 1960s,
Brazil requested long term assistance from U.S. universities to help build four
agricultural universities. Today, Brazil is an agricultural powerhouse in scientific
research and post graduate training in agriculture.  Currently, about three fourths
of EMPRAPA researchers pursuing M.Sc. degrees and more than half of
Embrapa’s researchers pursuing Ph.D. students are enrolled in Brazilian
universities.30
The art of crafting an interactive knowledge system should be viewed as a
pragmatic process that unfolds over decades.  But the crafting process must be led
by African scientists in close cooperation with farmers, politicians and urban
leaders who all agree that a dynamic smallholder agriculture can improve the
welfare of both rural and urban people.
4. Human Capital:  The Crown Jewels of NARS.  Human capital improvement
strategies are crucial issues because gifted and highly motivated scientists are the
core, i.e., “the crown jewels”, of a productive NARS.  However, in many
developing countries, scientists are treated like second class clerks and noodle
sellers.  In China, one observes that noodle sellers at the entrance of research
stations often earn higher incomes than Ph.D. scientists working at the stations.
To address the lagging salaries, the Government of China is pursuing a radical
reform of its incentive structure for its scientific staff.  The scientists are being
personally  evaluated and placed into two groups:  half will be named “elite
scientists”, given a 500 percent salary increase and charged with developing
world class biotechnology capability  (Huang et al. 2000).  The other half will
continue to receive their normal salaries with the expectation that many will retire
or pursue different jobs.  Turning to Latin America, the average current salary for
a senior scientist at EMBRAPA’s Tropical Cassava and Fruit Research Station in
Brazil is between US$14,500 and US$35,000 per year (Pires de Matos, 2001).  In
Ghana, the Director of the Cassava Research reported that the salaries for his
three cassava researchers were “too low to quote” (Otto, 2000).
Since the NARS of Africa are experiencing difficulties in retaining
African scientists, it is timely to examine the incentive structure (monetary and
non-monetary) and how it shapes human capital recruitment, mentoring,
promotion, rewards, attrition, and degradation.  Human capital degradation
represents the depreciation of knowledge because of premature death, lack of
library and information support systems, and a lack of a career structure which
motivates and rewards scientists in challenging careers.
In 1988 when I visited MARDI, the NARS of Malaysia, I discovered that
research officers had access to low interest loans for the purchase of a house and a
car, a once in a lifetime gift of an airplane ticket to Mecca, and a once in a career31
around the world air ticket as a capstone reward for working until the retirement
age of 55.  Another issue to explore is using information technology to build
human capital chains with members of the global scientific community.  For
example, a visitor to the Cassava Research Station in Brazil notices a computer at
the desk of every scientist and ready Web access.  How can African NARS
replace their training officers (travel agents) with human capital officers who
mentor scientists and help them become permanent crown jewels of a NARS?
5.  New Sources of Funding.  Competitive funding grants have emerged as a much
discussed solution to the funding crisis in African NARS (Reifscneider, Byerlee
and de Souza, 2000).  A number of studies have concluded that competitive
funding should be introduced on a pilot basis and viewed as a complement to core
funding of a NARS.  But setting up and operating a competitive funding program
is difficult for small NARS (e.g., fewer than 100 scientists) because of “high
administrative costs and limited potential for competition” (Byerlee, 2000).
6.  Building Biotechnology Capacity.  With the exception of Kenya, Zimbabwe and
South Africa, most African nations are at an early stage of biotechnology research
(ISNAR, 1999; Cohen, 1999; Qaim et al. 2001).  Ethiopia has prepared a twenty-
year biotechnology expansion plan, set up an agricultural technology research
coordination office and prepared plans to develop an Agricultural Biotechnology
Research Institute.  But in West Africa, progress is slow.  At independence in
1957, Ghana was one of the most economically advanced countries in Africa.
Today, Ghana does not have a coordinated national effort in biotechnology.
The critical issues in developing a national policy framework and research
priorities will entail close cooperation between the NARS and scientists from a
number of university facilities because, with the advent of the biotechnology
revolution, the dividing line between agricultural and nonagricultural sciences is
becoming blurred.  As a result, agricultural researchers will need to seek new
knowledge from university scientists at home and abroad in faculties of
agriculture, science, environment, law, commerce and social science, as well as
from private biotechnology and multinational seed and fertilizer firms.  The
challenge for the managers of NARS and Deans of Agriculture in Africa is to
figure out how their separately-governed research and teaching institutions can32
cooperate to build the foundation for biotechnology research.  For example, where
should a biotechnology research center be located?  On a university campus or at
a NARS?  Byerlee and Fischer (2000) have produced a valuable guide for
building biotechnology capacity.  This topic requires further debate and
experimentation.
7.  Policy Research.  In a globalized economy, farmers, research managers and
marketing firms urgently require policy outlook research on future market
prospects.  The managers of NARS urgently need the results of rigorous analysis
of changing comparative advantage in the context of liberalized global markets.
In addition, Grades and Standards are emerging as an important research topic
because of the growing role of global food chains in setting quality standards for
export commodities (Reardon et al. 2001).  But after forty years of pursuing
different approaches to building policy analysis capacity in Africa, there is no
proven model of how to strengthen policy research in Africa, how to maintain
quality and how to finance it over time (Babu, 1997; Gitu, 2000; Omamo, 2000;
Rukuni et al. 1998 and Idachaba, 2000).  This topic requires further debate and
experimentation.
8.  Sustainability.  The seventh issue ripe for debate is the financial and scientific
sustainability problem.  At present, economists do not have a practical appraisal
tool to determine what size of NARS a borrower should aim for and what are
indicators of success in achieving long-term institutional, and financial
sustainability.  There is a dearth of information on how to analyze the borrower’s
long term capacity to sustain NARS without donor support (Adoum, 2001).  Since
the issue of sustainability is masked in the early years of donor projects when
donors pay a large share of the project,  many NARS have added hundreds of
scientists without realizing that once the infrastructure is built, the main cost of
research is salaries.  Some hard analytical work needs to be done on the tough
questions on how to determine the long-term scientific and financial sustainability
of a NARS and various extension and university models.33
VI.    INSIGHTS FOR AFRICAN POLICY MAKERS,
         RESEARCH MANAGERS AND DONORS
This paper draws on historical and comparative data to address the critical problems
facing NARS in Africa.  The evidence presented embraces gradualism and learning by doing as a
proven pathway to building scientific capacity in food and agriculture.  But this requires African
resolve, African political leadership,  aggressive indigenous resource mobilization and long-term
donor assistance over the coming three or four decades.  Many NARS in Asia and Latin America
have slowly developed pluralistic, and competitive institutions (Byerlee, 1998; Elliott and
Echeverria, 2000).  This accretionary model of institution-building provides insights for
revitalizing the NARS in Africa over the coming decades.  But the needed reforms in NARS in
Africa should be viewed as part of a continuous process of change.  As new problems emerge,
new reforms will be necessary (Collion, 1999).
Although there are some similarities between Africa, Asia and Latin America, there are
two differences in terms of resources and political support for strengthening the NARS of Africa.
First, the threat of famine is not present in Africa as it was in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s.
Because of the lack of a famine threat and the ready availability of “food aid subscriptions,”
many African political leaders tend to view  agricultural research as a secondary activity that can
be financed by foreign aid.  Second, foreign aid accounts for an average of 40 percent (and in a
few countries, 60 percent) of NARS budgets in Africa.   Africa’s experience has shown that
erratic project aid can undermine the indigenous discipline that is needed to build fiscally self-
sustaining research systems.
Building a modern science base in agriculture in Africa must begin at the political level
as China did when the State Council recently issued a decree to pursue a new round of radical
reforms in order “to create a modern, responsive, internationally competitive and fiscally
sustainable research system” (Huang et al. 2000).  To be sure, foreign aid can serve as
“handmaiden” in assisting the NARS of Africa, but foreign aid and foreign experts are not a
substitute for time, learning by doing and learning from others.  In short, building a science-
based agriculture is an indigenous-led, accretionary process.
Today, the lack of political commitment in the State House is the biggest single missing
factor in building strong and productive NARS in Africa.  But there are seeds of hope in Uganda,
Kenya and Nigeria.  Uganda is providing political leadership in implementing a plan to34
modernize agriculture through a major decentralization programs, including the privatization of
extension.  KARI, the NARS in Kenya is engaged in a major retrenchment of staff that is aided
by an agreement that KARI, the EU and the World Bank negotiated with the Government of
Kenya.  This agreement allows KARI to retain the salaries of retrenched staff to improve the
terms and conditions of service of scientists.  In Nigeria, under the leadership of President
Obasanjo, the government recently announced that the salaries and fringe benefits of agricultural
researchers and university professors would be increased tenfold, i.e., from US$1,200 per year to
US$12,000 per year (Nweke, 2001).  These examples of political leadership in the State House
must now be supplemented with building support at the bottom—i.e. with farmers and other
clientele groups.
The bottom line is that African scientists – not donors – must take the lead in building
country-specific agricultural knowledge systems.  This is Africa’s challenge for the next 25 to 50
years!35
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